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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF FULTON COUNTY
STATE OF GEORGIA

ALAN B. THOMAS, JR. (directly and
derivatively in his capacity as a
shareholder of LecStar Corporation)
and HEATHER McFARLAND (directly
and derivatively in her capacity as a
shareholder of LecStar Corporation),
Plaintiffs,

v.
JOHN C. CANOUSE,
STEPHEN M. HICKS, SOUTH RIDGE
CAPITAL MANAGEMENT LLC,
DALE SMITH, CACHE CAPITAL
(USA), L.P., ATLANTIS CAPITAL
FUND, LTD., and McCORMACK
AVENUE, LTD.,

w.

Defendants,

v.
LECSTAR CORPORATION,
as a Nominal Defendant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CIVIL ACTION FILE
NO. 2004CV88793

------------------------)
Order on Motion for Summary Judgment
On December 4, 2008, Counsel appeared before this Court to present oral
argument on the Motion for Summary Judgment filed on behalf of Directors W. Dale
Smith and John C. Canouse as well as Southridge Defendants' Motion for Summary
Judgment, or, in the alternative, Partial Summary Judgment. 1 After reviewing the

1 Defendants Stephen M. Hicks, South ridge Capital Management LLC, and McCormack Avenue Ltd.
(collectively, the "Southridge Defendants" filed their motion for summary judgment on August 29,2003.

arguments made by counsel, the record of the case, and the briefs submitted on the
motions, the Court finds as follows:
This case involves alleged securities fraud. The Plaintiffs are three (3)
shareholders of the LecStar Corporation, a Texas corporation. LecStar was a publically
traded company, organized in 1998, that operated as a Competitive Local Exchange
("CLEC") in the deregulated telecom environment. LecStar operated in eight states in
the Southeast. LecStar Corporation is now dissolved.
LecStar Corporation had one subidiary, LecStar COr}lmunications Corporation, a
Delaware corporation, which wholly owned two additional subsidiaries LecStar Telecom
("Telecom") and LecStar DataNet ("DataNet"), both Georgia corporations (collectively
together with LecStar Corp. and LecStar Communications Corp. "LecStar"). Plaintiffs
filed this action individually and derivatively on behalf of LecStar in 2004 against three
(3) former LecStar managers, who allegedly fraudulently transferred all of LecStar's
assets to Defendant McCormack Avenue Ltd., a British Virgin Islands corporation
("McCormack") for their own benefit.

In addition, Plaintiffs allege that Defendant Cache

Capital (USA), LP ("Cache"), owned in part by Defendant John Canouse and his brother
Joseph Canouse, along with Defendants Southridge Capital Management LLC
("Southridge") and Atlantis Capital Fund. Ltd. ("Atlantis"), both entities controlled by
Defendant Hicks, allegedly participated in the conspiracy to fraudulently transfer all of
LecStar's assets to McCormack.
In April and May of 2002, LecStar entered into eight secured loans with
Southridge and other institutional investors such as Maple Circle (an entity formed and
controlled by Defendant Hicks), as well as with individual LecStar officers including Dale
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Smith, President, William Woulfin, CEO, Jim Malcom, CFO, and Donald Santavicca,
Controller. For each loan, LecStar entered into a promissory note with the lender.
Some of those notes, such as the second Maple Circle note,2 granted the holder a "first
priority security interest in all of the assets" of LecStar including the stock of DataNet
and Telecom. Plaintiffs contend that other notes, such as the Woulfin and Malcom
notes, did not originally provide the holder with such security, although those notes were
later amended to grant a first priority interest on all assets including the stock of
DataNet and Telecom.3 The total amount due on the notes was $769,000. Each note
was required to be paid either at a maturity date prior to December, 2002, or upon
demand.
In October, 2002, James Grenfell, former CEO of LecStar, obtained an arbitration
award against LecStar for over $1 million. The award was affirmed by Cobb County
Superior Court on November 4, 2002.
Around November 25, 2002, all eight promissory notes, and their attendant
rights, were assigned to McCormack. At this time the law firm of Blank Rome Tenzer
Greenblatt, LLP ("Blank Rome"), which had previously represented LecStar and which
continued to remain in close contact with Defendant Hicks, began representing

2 Maple Circle entered into 3 promissory notes with LecStar: the first in the amount of $175,000.00 in
July, 2002, the second in the amount of $175,000.00 in August, 2002, and the third in the amount of
$90,000.00 in September, 2002.
3 Plaintiffs assert that the original terms of the promissory notes with the William Woulfin, Jim Malcom,
Southshore Capital Fund Ltd.,a British Virgin Islands corporation created by Hicks, and the first Maple
Circle Ltd., another British Virgin Islands corporation created by Hicks, were either unsecured or
contained a security interest that excluded Telecom and DataNet. Copies of the promissory notes are
included in the record at Plaintiffs' Exhibits 24 and 27. Those notes, however, all list the security interest
as a "first priority security interst in all the assets of the Payor (the "Collateral") to secure the payment of
this Note .... " Citing William Woulfin's Affidavit, Plaintiffs allege that the security interest was later
expanded to include all assets between August 30,2002 and November 14, 2002. Plaintiffs Exhibit 50.
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McCormack in the "asset acquisition" of LecStar. 4 On December 2, 2002, McCormack,
through Blank Rome, made demand upon LecStar for immediate payment of all
principal and interest due on the notes. 5 McCormack offered to accept all of the
LecStar assets, including the stock of DataNet and Telecom (the collateral) for the notes
in full satisfaction of the debt.
At the time of the McCormack demand, the LecStar Board of Directors was
comprised of Messrs. Smith, Canouse, and Woulfin.6 Because Directors Smith and
Woulfin issued notes to LecStar, which they assigned to McCormack, they resigned
their directorships and did not participate in decision to accept or reject McCormack's
offer. Director John Canouse (a Defendant in this action), acting as the sole director of
LecStar, accepted McCormack's offer and voluntarily surrendered to McCormack all of
LecStar's assets including the stock of Telecom and DataNet. At this time, LecStar's
stock was trading at 1¢. The following day, on December 6, 2002, LecStar Corp. and
LecStar Communications Corp. entered into an Acceptance of Collateral Agreement
with McCormack ("Acceptance Agreement") whereby the physical assets and the stock
in DataNet and Telecom were transferred to McCormack. After the McCormack
transaction there was no change in the telecommunications services provided through
DataNet and Telecom, the operating divisions of LecStar.
In September 2003, McCormack transferred the former LecStar assets to LTEL
Holding Corporation ("LTEL") in a stock exchange for approximately $28 million. LTEL
is a Delaware company formed by Defendant Hicks on November 21, 2002? At the

4
5
6
7

See, §:..9.:., Plaintiffs' Exhibits 22 and 30.
Plaintiffs' Exhibit 77.
See Plaintiffs' Exhibit 37.
Plaintiffs' Exhibit 4

4

time of the transfer, Defendant Smith was the President and sole director of LTEL.
Defendants Smith and Hicks, along with William Woulfson, all former LecStar officers,
were re-elected as officers of LTEL and received stock in LTEL as a result of their
"continued service" to the company and/or by signing a release of debt against LTEL.

8

Additional LTEL shareholders include McCormack, Cache, and Canouse, as well as Jim
Malcom, and Donald Santavicca, who together with Defendants Smith and Hicks and
William Woulfson comprised the majority of LTEL shareholders.
In the fall of 2003, LTEL and Fonix entered into a merger agreement which
closed in April, 2004. Pursuant to the terms of the merger agreement, Fonix acquired
LTEL, which continued as a Fonix subsidiary, for $33 million dollars. Fonix filed for
bankruptcy in October 2006.
The heart of the debate in this case revolves around LecStar's valuation at the
time of the McCormack transaction. Plaintiffs challenge the decision of the LecStar
Board of Directors (i.e., Defendant Canouse) to relinquish all LecStar assets to satisfy a
debt of approximately $769,000. Plaintiffs allege that the transfer was a part of a
fraudulent scheme to avoid the company's obligation to Grenfell and to eliminate the
rights of certain minority shareholders. Defendants, on the other hand, assert that the
McCormack transaction was fair and reasonable. Defendants assert that at the time of
the sale, LecStar was operating at a deficit of approximately $200,000 per month and
that the forced liquidation sale of the assets drastically drove down the value of the
assets.
Determining the valuation of LecStar at the time of the McCormack transaction is
difficult due to the conflicting valuation reports of the parties and contemporaneous
8

See e.g., Plaintiffs' Exhibits 2 and 109.
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statements made by Defendants. LecStar was an operating CLEC in the Southeast that
had over 24,000 customers and a significant infrastructure developed. In the months
immediately leading up to the McCormack transaction, Defendant Hicks issued press
releases praising the company's customer and revenue growth as well as its debt
consolidation. In addition, contemporaneous Securities and Exchange Commission
("SEC") filings reflected historical operating losses as well as current cash flow
problems, but also documented a growing customer base, revenue stream, and debt
consolidation.
Adding to the conflicting views of valuation are the different LecStar valuations
generated around the time of the McCormack transaction. One estimate provided by
Southeast Associates9 valued the assets between $82,516 and $264,825. Another
report prepared by a Southridge employee valued LecStar at $26.3 million. In addition,
Mr. Francom, Plaintiffs' expert, valued the LecStar assets worth between $18 and $25.5
million on December 5, 2002. Within thirty days of the McCormack transaction, another
third party appraiser, Ladenburg Thalmann & Co., Inc., estimated LecStar's assets to be
worth between $8.27 and $10.57 million. Additionally, McCormack reported the value of
its asset/stock exchange with LTEL as worth approximately $27 million in February
2003, only a few months after the McCormack transaction. Finally, the LTELlFonix
transaction closed in 2004 for a total of $33 million. The table below outlines the
different valuations, as well as their sources and dates.

In October, 2002, LecStar retained and paid Southeast Associates a retainer to conduct an appraisal of
the business. That retainer was eventually returned to LecStar and the valuation was ultimately paid for
by Maple Circle, a creditor of LecStar, before the notes were assigned to McCormack. The record also
contains various email correspondences between Defendant Hicks and Southeast Associates regarding
the valuation of LecStar.
9
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Date
December 10,
2002

Source
Southeast Associates Fair Market
Valuation of Orderly Liquidation Value

Dec. 20021
January 2003
December 5, 2008
(performed 2007)
December 30,
2002
September 5,2003
(Date Sale Closed)
[Merger signed
February 2003]
February, 2004
(Date Merger
Closed)

LecStar Model Southridge employee
valuation of LecStar
Mr. Francom, Plaintiffs' expert

LecStar Valuation
$264,825 FMV
$82,516 forced liquidation
value
$26.3 million
$ 18-25.5 million

$8.27-10.57 million
Ladenburg Thalmann & Co., Inc.
valuation
McCormack report to the SEC when it $20 million + $7.5 million
transferred LecStar assets to LTEL
option

Stock transfer of LTEL to Fonix

$33 million

STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
The Southridge Defendants, joined by Defendants Canouse and Smith, assert
that the statute of limitations bars Plaintiff McFarland's claims because the transfer of
assets occurred in 2002, but Plaintiff McFarland did not join the action until April 2007.
Citing the applicable four year statute of limitations, V.T.C.A. § 16.004, Defendants
assert that Plaintiff McFarland's claims are time barred and not subject to relation back
to the original pleadings. See Crowley v. Coles, 760 S.W.23d 347.
Plaintiffs argue, however, that Georgia law controls this issue because relation
back is a procedural matter. See Griffen v. Hunt Refining Co., 292 Ga. App. 451
(2008). Pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9-11-15(c), relation back is allowed whenever there is
an identity of interests between the old and new parties so that it will not create
prejudice to the opposing party. If leave is sought to change or add plaintiffs after the
expiration of the statute of limitation, provided "the claim ... asserted in the amended
[complaint] arises out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted
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to be set forth in the original [complaint], the amendment relates back to the date of the
original [complaint]." Morris v. Chewning, 201 Ga. App. 658, 659, (1991) (citing OCGA §
9-11-15(c)). Plaintiffs assert that both Ms. McFarland and Mr. Thomas are shareholders
and therefore share a unity of interests. Additionally, the claims brought by Ms.
McFarland in Sixth Amended Complaint arise out of same conduct and same
transaction (the McCormack transaction) complained of in the original Complaint.
The Court finds that Georgia law prevails on the issue of relation back. The
Court also finds that Plaintiff McFarland shares a unity of interest with Plaintiff Thomas
and alleges claims arising out of the same transaction so that Defendants are not
prejudiced by Plaintiff McFarland's claim. Thus, the Court hereby DENIES Defendants'
Motion for Summary Judgment on the statute of limitation claim as to Plaintiff
McFarland.
STANDING
Defendants Smith and Canouse contend that Plaintiffs Thomas and McFarland
lack standing to assert direct claims against them for breach of fiduciary duty because
the claims are derivative in nature and must be pled as such. Whether a claim is direct
or derivative in nature is determined by the law of the state of incorporation. Karmen v.
Kemper Fin. Servs. Inc., 500 U.S. 90,108-109 (1991).
The Texas code allowing the distinction between a direct and derivative action to
be relaxed in the context of a shareholder derivative suit in a closely held corporation is
inapplicable in this case because LecStar does not qualify under that statute. V.A.T.S.
Bus.Corp.Act, Art. 5.14(L). Aside from the statutorily provided exception, Texas case
law does not recognize a general relaxation of the direct/derivative distinction. Redmon
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v. Griffith, 202 S.W.3d 225, 236 (Tex. App. 2006) ("The fiduciary duty an officer or
director owes to the corporation is distinguishable from a fiduciary relationship that may
exist between majority and minority shareholders or otherwise by contract or other
special relationship between the individual parties."); ct. Haggett v. Brown, 971 S.W.2d
472,487 n.13 (Tex. App. 1997) (recognizing "limited circumstances" where a majority
shareholder owes a fiduciary duty to the minority shareholder); Norman v. Nash
Johnson & Sons' Farms, Inc., 537 S.E.2d 248,255 (N.C. Ct. App. 2000) (discussing
North Carolina and other states' recognition of a minority shareholder's right to bring a
direct action against a wrongdoing or oppressive majority shareholder). Because
Plaintiffs have not demonstrated a unique or special injury or the existence of a fiduciary
relationship separate from that created by Defendants' roles as directors of LecStar, the
Court hereby GRANTS Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment on Plaintiffs' direct
claims of fiduciary duty for lack of standing.
Defendants Smith and Canouse also contend that Plaintiffs Thomas and
McFarland fail the standing requirements for derivative suits articulated in Article 5.14 of
the Texas Business Corporations Act, because they (a) fail to "adequately represent the
interests of the corporation," and (b) Plaintiff McFarland failed to make a separate
demand upon the corporation.
Whether a plaintiff shareholder adequately represents the interests of the
corporation is a decision for the trial court, which shall not be disturbed absent abuse of
discretion. Zeidman v. J. Ray McDermott & Co., Inc., 651 F.2d 1030, 1040 (5th Cir.
1981). A plaintiff in a shareholder derivative action owes the corporation his undivided
loyalty. The plaintiff must not have ulterior motives and must not be pursuing an external
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personal agenda. In deciding this question, the court may properly consider Plaintiffs'
stake in the corporation as balanced against their interests and how the litigation may
affect their external interests. Smith v. Ayres, 977 F.2d 946, 949 (5th Cir. 1992). "The
trial court may properly consider the plaintiff's vindictiveness toward the defendant in
determining whether the plaintiff is an adequate representative of the stockholders." lQ.
In Smith, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court's conclusion that
the shareholder plaintiff was not an adequate representative where that plaintiff's
company share was 1/10,000,000 of the authorized shares and where the plaintiff had a
history of lawsuits and personal animosity against the director defendants.
In this case, Defendants assert that Plaintiffs have a personal agenda contrary to
the interests of the corporation because (1) they are former executives or are related to
former executives who were fired in 2001; and (2) they are advancing the interests of
Mr. Grenfell, LecStar's former CEO and judgment creditor of LecStar. Additionally,
Defendants contend that because Defendants held the majority of interests in LecStar
Plaintiffs should not to be found to adequately represent the interests of the corporation.
The Court finds that Plaintiffs hold a sufficient ownership interest in LecStar in
order to bring this action. Additionally, Plaintiffs have fully disclosed their relationship
with Mr. Grenfell and the terms of the stipulation agreement entered into with him. The
Court finds that Plaintiffs' relationship with Mr. Grenfell does not demonstrate
"vindictiveness" towards either Defendants or the corporation sufficient to strip them of
their rights to bring a derivative action.

10

With respect to Plaintiff McFarland's demand requirement, the Court finds that
Plaintiff McFarland may join in the original demand brought by Plaintiff Thomas. 1o
Previous demands and the subsequent decision by the board of directors should "bind
similarly situated shareholders making identical claims. Judicial economy demands that
identical claims, which in actuality belong to the corporation, be simultaneously
disposed of by one demand." Pace v. Jordan, 999 S.W.2d 615, 621 (Tex. App.1999);
see also Tex. Bus. Corp. Act Ann. Art. 5.14 (demand is required "unless the shareholder
has earlier been notified that the demand has been rejected by the corporation .... ").
Accordingly, the Court hereby DENIES Defendants' Motion for Summary
Judgment on the grounds that Plaintiffs lack standing to bring a derivative action.
BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTIES
Director Defendants seek summary judgment on the grounds that their actions
are protected by the business judgment rule. Under Texas law, the business judgment
rule is "a rule of substantive law under which a corporate director is entitled to a
presumption of validity and good faith that cannot be overcome unless the plaintiff
pleads and proves (1) that the directors' conduct was either ultra vires or fraudulent, or
(2) that the directors had a personal interest in the transactions complained of." F.D.I.C.
v. Schreiner, 892 F.Supp. 869, 880 -881 (W.D.Tex. 1995). In addition, a director's
action that is grossly negligent may not be protected by the business judgment rule in
Texas. TTT Hope, Inc. v. Hill, 2008 WL 4155465, *9 (S.D.Tex. 2008): see also,
F.D.I.C. v. Benson, 867 F.Supp. 512, 523 (S.D.Tex. 1994) (concluding that Texas

10 Plaintiff McFarland asserts that she made an independent demand upon LecStar on April 20, 2004.
That demand is not in the record and is contested by Defendants.
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business-judgment rule will protect a director as long as his acts are not grossly
negligent or a complete abdication of duty).
Defendants assert that the McCormack transaction was approved by Defendant
Canouse who, at the time, was not a creditor of LecStar, a shareholder/officer in
McCormack, or a shareholder/officer in LTEL 11 and therefore was uninterested.
Defendants argue that a transaction approved by uninterested directors, regardless of
other potential conflicts, is protected by the business judgment rule. Roth v. Mims, 298
8.R. 272, 288 (N.D.Tex. 2003) ("An interested transaction may nevertheless be valid if
(1) the material facts of the relationship or interest are disclosed and the transaction is
approved by a majority of the disinterested directors ... ). Plaintiffs allege that Defendant
Canouse

wa~

"interested" in the transaction, breached his duty of loyalty to the

corporation, engaged in fraudulent conduct, acted with gross negligence, and was not
provided with all material information regarding the McCormack transaction.
Officers and directors owe a duty of loyalty to their corporation to act only in the
corporation's and its shareholders' best interest. In re Performance Nutrition, Inc., 239
B.R. 93, 110 (N.D.Tex. 1999). To fulfill the duty of loyalty, a director must exercise an
"extreme measure of candor, unselfishness and good faith," particularly where there is
an interested transaction. International Bankers Life Insurance Co. v. Holloway, 368
S.W.2d 567, 577 (Tex. 1963). Whether an officer or director is "interested" is a question
of fact and encompasses transactions where the director derives a personal profit or
which deprive the corporation of an opportunity to profit. Id.

Defendant Canouse later obtained shares in McCormack and again in LTEL as a result of the
McCormackiLTEL transaction. In addition, Cache, along with Atlantis and Sherman-entities in which
both Defendant Canouse and his brother Joseph Canouse held interests and/or influence (advisors)held shares in LecStar and later obtained shares in McCormack and LTEL.

11
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Defendant Canouse testified in his deposition that at the time of the McCormack
transaction he did not have an interest in McCormack nor did he expect to have an
interest in the assets transferred. That testimony notwithstanding, within one year of the
McCormack transaction, the LecStar assets were transferred from McCormack to LTEL
where Defendant Canouse was made a director and a shareholder without providing
consideration other than his "continued service" .12 Both McCormack and LTEL were
created within the months preceding the McCormack transaction, and were both
controlled by Hicks as an officer and director and through his affiliated entities (i.e.,
Southridge) as majority shareholders. In addition, Defendant Hicks sent emails in
December 2002 discussing a future transfer of assets from McCormack to LTEL.
Plaintiffs also allege that Hicks and Canouse had a long-standing and close personal
and business relationship.
The McCormack transaction was a coordinated effort among LecStar's creditors-Hicks, Hicks-controlled entities (Southshore, Maple Circle) and LecStar officers and
directors (Smith, Hicks, Woulfin, Malcom, Santi vacca). LecStar executed secured notes
to these creditors, who then transferred all of the notes to McCormack, an off-shore
entity recently created by Hicks. McCormack then made a demand upon LecStar,
which was approved by Canouse as the sole remaining director. Before the
McCormack transaction was approved, LecStar was represented by Blank Rome, who,
after a series of communications with Defendant Hicks and other LecStar officers and
directors, began representing McCormack. In fact, Blank Rome served McCormack's
demand letter on LecStar, its former client. These communications between Blank
Rome, Defendant Hicks, and other LecStar officers and directors raise serious
12

Plaintiffs' Exhibit 2.

13

questions regarding the McCormack transaction, especially in light of the fact that
neither Blank Rome's alternating allegiance and communications with the LecStar
officers and directors were not disclosed to the LecStar Board of Directors (Le.,
Defendant Canouse) at the December 5,2002 board meeting.
Defendants refer the Court to Board of Directors' due diligence actions in
reviewing the McCormack transaction citing to financial reports prepared by the CFO, a
report from bankruptcy counsel Arnall Golden & Gregory,13 previous restructuring
efforts, cost-cutting measures, and the independent appraisal report prepared by
Southeast Appraisal Resource Association. Defendants highlight that pursuant to
Texas law, a director may rely in good faith and with ordinary care on the opinion,
reports, and information prepared by officers and employees of the corporation as well
as professionals hired by the corporation such as attorneys and accountants. Tex. Bus.
Corp. Act. Ann. Art. 2.41 D.
LecStar CFO James Malcom, creditor of LecStar and future shareholder/director
in LTEL, reported to the Board on December 5, 2003, that additional funding was
necessary to continue the company and that he has substantial doubt regarding the
company's future as a going concern. Mr. Malcom also reported to the LecStar Board
that the company had exhausted all other remedies because it had restructured its
liabilities and capital to attract investors, which failed, and had cut corporate overhead
as much as possible but was unable to meet its cash needs. Malcom's financial interest
as a creditor of LecStar (known by the Board) and his future interest in LTEL as a

13 The LecStar Board of Directors received a report from bankruptcy counsel, Arnall, Golden and Gregory
that bankruptcy was not a viable option. In addition, during the December 5, 2002 Board meeting, the
Board concluded that LecStar had $20,000 in capital to cover $200,000 in ongoing operational costs.
See Plaintiffs' Exhibit 37.
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shareholder and director call into question whether or not a director could rely in good
faith upon his report. Additionally, Plaintiffs assert that Malcom had knowledge of the
Southridge report valuing LecStar at $26 million, but did not disclose that report to the
Board of Directors.
In addition, Plaintiffs challenge the independence of the LecStar valuation
prepared by Southeast. LecStar paid Southeast a retainer to conduct the valuation, but
that money was ultimately returned to LecStar when Maple Circle, a creditor of LecStar
and entity controlled by Defendant Hicks, funded the valuation report. In addition, the
record contains several emails from Defendant Hicks communicating with Southeast
regarding their valuation report to provide it with information or to comment on valuation
estimates or techniques. 14 This information regarding the Southeast valuation was not
disclosed to the LecStar Board of Directors prior to voting on the McCormack
transaction. Finally, the Southeast valuation report was not finalized until December 10,
2002, five days after the Board of Directors' meeting.
Defendants also argue that there was no alternative to the McCormack
transaction because the notes issued were valid and due. Because an officer or
director has a contractual right to take a certain action, does not establish as a matter of
law that he/she did not breach a fiduciary duty in exercising that right. Spethmann v.
Anderson, 171 S.W. 3d 680, 696 (Tex. App. 2005).

In Spethmann, director defendants

entered into a buy sell agreement with the corporation. The company repurchased
shares after two director/shareholders resigned over conflict. In buying back the stock,
it depleted the company of over 80% of its assets. The Court held as a matter of law
14 See. e.g., Plaintiffs' Exhibit 66 (November, 2002, email from Defendant Hicks to Southeast reviewing
the LecStar Appraisal and suggesting changes, including the insertion of McCormack Avenue into the
report); see also Plaintiffs' Exhibit 57.
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that complying with the buy-sell agreement did not make the transaction fair to the
corporation as a matter of law, and thus upheld a jury verdict for breach of fiduciary
duty. Id. As in Spethmann, the Court in this action must determine whether the
McCormack transaction was not only authorized by contractual rights, but was
undertaken in compliance with fiduciary duties owed to the corporation.
Defendants argue that there is no evidence of Canouse's interest in the
transaction, fraud, or negligence. The Court disagrees and finds that Plaintiffs have
raised questions of fact regarding whether material information about the relationship
and interest of the other directors was disclosed prior to Canouse's approval of the
McCormack transaction. Additionally, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have raised
questions of fact regarding whether or not Defendant Canouse was interested in the
McCormack transaction and/or acted in good faith in approving it. See Gearhart Indus.!
Inc. v. Smith Int'I, Inc., 741 F.2d 707, 719-720 (5th Cir. 1984); Int'I Bankers Life Ins. Co.
v. Holloway, 368 S.W.2d 567, 577 (Tex. 1963); General Dynamics v. Torres, 915
S.W.2d 45 (Tex. App. 1995). Ultimately, Canouse personally profited from the
transaction which deprived LecStar and its remaining shareholders of the assets. That
the directors inserted a shell entity (McCormack) to hold the assets in between the
transfer from LecStar to LTEL does not necessarily insulate those directors from breach
of fiduciary duty suits; otherwise, fiduciary duties of loyalty could be abrogated by simply
inserting a middle man.
Finally, Plaintiffs raise questions of fact regarding whether or not Defendant
Canouse participated in a "fraudulent" scheme. Defendants assert that Plaintiff's
inability to demonstrate that Canouse knew about the scheme at the time of the transfer
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merits summary judgment in their favor. Knowledge, however, is usually determined by
circumstantial evidence, which has been sufficiently entered into the record here to
raise irresolvable questions of fact (e.g., the transfer of the notes, the timing of
McCormack/L TEL creation, the grant of stock in LTEL, the overlapping web of control
by Hicks/Canouse/Joseph Canouse over the entities involved). Taylor Elec. Services,
Inc. v. Armstrong Elec. Supply Co., 167 S.W.3d 522, 528 (Tex. App. 2005). The Court,
however, agrees with Defendants that Plaintiffs have failed to rebut the business
judgment rule on the grounds that Canouse acted with gross negligence.
A transaction that is not protected by the business judgment rule, may still be upheld
if the transaction was fair as a matter of law. Roth v. Mims, 298 B.R. 272, 288 (N.D.
Tex. 2003). To satisfy the entire fairness test, Texas courts review the "full adequacy of
the consideration." Crook v. Williams Drug Co., Inc., 558 S.W.2d 500, 506 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1977). Defendants contend that the Southeast appraisal of LecStar is evidence of
a fair price, therefore satisfying the entire fairness test. For the reasons addressed
above, the Court will not rely solely on the Southeast appraisal. In addition, alternative
valuations provided by Southridge, Ladenburg, Francom, and the subsequent LTEL and
FONIX transactions valued the assets substantially higher than in the report prepared
by Southeast. Therefore, the Court rejects Defendants' argument that they are entitled
to summary judgment under the entire fairness test even if the business judgment rule
does not apply to the McCormack transaction.
Accordingly, the Court hereby DENIES Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment
on the Breach of Fiduciary Duty Claims.
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AIDING AND ABETTING A BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY
Defendants assert that Plaintiffs fail to establish all elements of "aiding and
abetting" as provided in Insight technology Inc., v. FreightCheck, LLC, 280 Ga. App. 19,
25 (2006), because no fiduciary duties were breached and no actions were taken by the
Southridge Defendants. In light of the Court's ruling on fiduciary duty claims above,
Defendants' first argument fails. Citing to the Woulfin Affidavit, Plaintiffs assert that the
Southridge Defendants participated in this scheme by "repapering" the notes that were
transferred, in part by the Southridge Defendants, to McCormack which lead to the
foreclosure. Plaintiffs assert that the original notes to Wolfson and Malcom were not
secured and that the original Southshore and Maple Circle notes had a limited collateral
description excluding the stock of Telecom and DataNet. 15 Finally, Plaintiffs point out
that Hicks formed LTEL in November, 2002 as part of the alleged scheme to transfer
the assets back onshore after they were foreclosed upon by McCormack. The record
also contains email correspondences between the secured creditors and the Blank
Rome attorney, with Hicks copied, discussing the plan for a subsequent transfer of the
assets.16
The Court hereby finds that questions of fact remain regarding whether or not the
Southridge Defendants acted to procure a breach of fiduciary duty; therefore, the Court

Plaintiffs Exhibits 24-27 address the eight promissory notes. Those exhibits, however do not contain
promissory notes with a restricted collateral description. Instead, the provided promissory notes
specifically state that the creditor is given a first priority security interest in all assets. Plaintiffs point to
Woulfin's Affidavit, Plaintiffs' Exhibit 50, as proof that the notes were repapered where he states that he
participated, along with Defendant Smith, in repapering the notes. Additionally, Plaintiffs highlight Exhibits
25 and 26, the UCC financing statements filed by Maple Circle in August, 2002, which lists its security
interest in LecStar's assets as accounts receivable, proceeds from loans, proceeds from the issuance of
debt or equity, and proceeds from any legal settlement or judgment.
16 See e.g., Plaintiffs Exhibits 31, 43, and 93.
15
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hereby DENIES Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment on the Aiding and Abetting
Breach of Fiduciary Duty claims.
CIVIL CONSPIRACY
Plaintiffs have demonstrated triable issues of fact that Defendants may have
participated in a civil conspiracy to commit torts. Insight Technology, Inc. v.
FreightCheck, LLC, 280 Ga. App. 19 (2006) ("Turning to the issue of whether Insight
has identified specific evidence giving rise to a triable issue, we conclude that Insight
adduced evidence from which a jury could infer that Hull, acting as an agent of both
GetLoaded and FreightCheck, tortuously procured Brewer's breach of his fiduciary duty,
damaging Insight".); Strange v. Housing Authority of Summmerville, 268 Ga. App. 403,
410 (2004). The Court hereby DENIES Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment on
Plaintiffs' claims of civil conspiracy.
GEORGIA UNIFORM FRADULENT TRANSFERS ACT ("GUFTA")
Plaintiffs allege that Defendants violated O.C.G.A. §§ 18-2-74(a)(1) and 18-275(a) with the McCormack transaction. GUFTA protects valid creditors from sham
asset transfers by debtors for the purposes of hiding assets from that creditor. Plaintiffs
assert the GUFTA claims both directly and derivatively.
Pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 18-2-71(4) a creditor is "a person who has a claim." A
claim is defined as "a right to payment, whether or not the right is reduced to judgment,
liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed,
legal, equitable, secured or unsecured." lQ.. (3). Because this Court has already
granted summary judgment to Defendants on Plaintiffs direct claims, Plaintiffs cannot
qualify as creditors under GUFTA to bring direct claims.

19

On their derivative claims, Plaintiffs contend that when the LecStar Board of
Directors approved the McCormack transaction on December 5,2002, Plaintiffs became
creditors of a claim for breach of fiduciary duty. In this scenario, LecStar is the debtor
and Defendants are beneficial transferees. See Qwest Comm'ns Corp. v. Weisz, 278 F.
Supp. 2d 1188, 1191 (S.D. Cal. 2003) ("[J]udgment may be had against transferees or
"the person for whose benefit the transfer was made."). This argument, however,
ignores that derivative actions bring claims belonging to the corporation, but raised by
the shareholders. This distinction is more than intellectual, and is evidenced by the
requirement that any recovery in a derivative suit inures to the corporation, not to the
shareholders individually. Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531,538-539 (1970) ("The
proceeds of the [shareholder derivative suit] belong to the corporation and it is bound by
the result of the suit.") Thus, in this scenario, Plaintiffs seek to bring a claim on behalf of
LecStar as the creditor against LecStar as the debtor. While GUFTA is written with
broad language to provide a flexible statute to facilitate the recovery of fraudulent
transfers, the language of the statute cannot be stretched so that Plaintiffs can bring a
suit alleging that LecStar is both the creditor and debtor in a single transaction. The
Court hereby GRANTS Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment on Plaintiffs'
GUFTA claims.
UNJUST ENRICHMENT
The Southridge Defendants seek summary judgment on Plaintiffs' claim of unjust
enrichment arguing that none of the LecStar assets were transferred to Mr. Hicks or
Southridge. Plaintiffs, on the other hand, assert that the Defendants were enriched
because they received stock in LTEL (because of past service and release of claims)
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and subsequently in Fonix as a term of the merger with LTEL. "Where one unjustly
obtains a pecuniary advantage of another to which he is not legally entitled and refuses
to make restitution, an action for unjust enrichment lies .... it is not essential that the
defendant come into possession of money or property, but simply that he be unjustly
enriched by obtaining some financial advantage of the plaintiff." Trust Co. of Ga. v. S. &
W. Cafeteria, 97 Ga. App. 268, 284 (1958).
The Court hereby DENIES Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment on
Plaintiffs' unjust enrichment claims because questions of fact remain.

DISTRIBUTION OF PROCEEDS
Defendants seek summary judgment on the alternative grounds that LecStar was
insolvent at the time of the McCormack transaction so there were no damages, and that
even if damages were recovered, eighty percent of any recovery would be distributed to
Defendants as the majority shareholders. Tex. Bus. Corp. Act. Art. 6.04. The Court
finds these questions of damages premature in light of the outstanding questions of
liability and DENIES Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment on these grounds.

SO ORDERED this

liR

day of

JO\Y1~

,2009.

ALICE D. BONNER, SENIOR JUDGE
Superior Court of Fulton County
Atlanta Judicial Circuit
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